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INCREMENTAL INDEPENDENCE: CONFORMING THE LAW
TO THE PROCESS OF ADOLESCENCE
ABSTRACT
This Note examines the legal inconsistencies arising from the
modern application of the child/adult dichotomy to age of majority
and proposes the creation of a distinct legal category of adolescence.
After reviewing historic and cross-cultural approaches in conferring
"adulthood," this Note examines the evolution of the modern U.S.
legal system into the "hodge-podge" of policies affecting adolescents
today. This landscape of inconsistencies was dramatically shifted in
2005 when the U.S. Supreme Court inRoper v. Simmons categorically
struck down capital punishment for all defendants who were under
the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. Extending the Court's
reliance on developmental psychology and scientific research, this
Note proposes a bifurcated framework balancing adolescent capacity
with the level of risk to society (and self) in six milestone activities.
Finally, in applying this new bifurcated framework, the author pro-
poses that we raise the age of full majority to twenty-one, lower the
voting age to include at least sixteen-year-olds, and adopt legal flexi-
bility for adolescent milestones in between sixteen and twenty-one,
including extending licensing provisions beyond driving to include
alcohol, tobacco, and firearm use. Such an approach would reward
and encourage teenage responsibility as well as empower parents to
make individualized assessments of their child's adult capacity.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been considerable recent legal scholarship,' as well
as judicial notice,2 of the web of inconsistent laws and policies we
have for individuals in late adolescence.3 Under the common law, the
age of majority was generally twenty-one and applied evenly across
various areas of contract law.4 Historical developments5 led to the
Children's Rights Movement in the 1960s and 1970s that sought to
expand the government's role as parens patriae to protect abused or
1. See Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and
Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL'Y 275, 277 (2006) (discussing the historical development of the current laws that
govern children in America); see also Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counter-
revolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making
Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 67 (1999) (arguing that a paternalistic attitude
towards youth in criminal matters remains appropriate despite increasing autonomy
given to American youth in noncriminal matters); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent
Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1266-67 (2000)
(discussing the contrast between minors who are treated as adult criminals but are still
considered legally incapable of making medical decisions); Kimberly M. Mutcherson,
Minor Discrepancies: Forging a Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence in
Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927,927-28 (2006)
(arguing that if adolescents are treated as adults in criminal matters, there is little
justification for denying rights to teenagers in other legal contexts); Jacqueline Cuncannan,
Note, Only When They're Bad: The Rights and Responsibilities of Our Children, 51 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 273, 275-76 (1997) (discussing the state law trend towards
stricter punishment of juvenile delinquents as compared to laws which assume adoles-
cents incapable of independent decision making in noncriminal matters); Jon-Michael
Foxworth, Note, An Unjust Act: The Schizophrenic State of Maturity and Culpability
in Juvenile Justice and Minor Abortion Rights Law; Recent Trends in Virginia and
Nationally, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495,495-96 (2003) (discussing "contrary equivo-
cations of adolescence as adulthood in criminal law and adolescence as childhood" in
abortion laws).
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring the application of the death penalty
in cases where the defendant was under eighteen years old at the time of the offense).
3. Id. at 569, app. D at 585-87.
4. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 290, 296.
5. Landmark cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, most notably In re Gault and
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, significantly altered the
legal landscape for minors amidst the overall social realignment of the 1960s. Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (extending individual First
Amendment political liberties to minors); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1967) (extending
individual constitutional due process protections to minors, specifically the right to counsel
in a criminal proceeding); see MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS 5-7 (2005) (describing the context within which the children's rights movement
developed).
6. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 31 (1982).
The Progressive era at the turn of the twentieth century launched the first wave of
children's rights, emphasizing child labor laws and promotion of education, with the state
acting as parens patriae to supplement the protection afforded children by families. See
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 5, at 1, 6.
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neglected children and offer greater protections for all children.' At
the same time, frustration with the war in Vietnam and the military
draft fueled the 1971 enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, which lowered the minimum voting age from
twenty-one to eighteen,8 and later fueled the lowering of the legal age
to purchase and consume alcohol from twenty-one to eighteen.9 In the
1980s and 1990s the pendulum shifted away from allowing adoles-
cents increased autonomy to increasingly holding them responsible
as adults for their missteps in using their new freedoms.° Since this
shift, states and courts have carved out a myriad of exceptions and
methods to accommodate the needs of adolescents in their daily lives,
accommodations which the law does not directly provide."
In an attempt to conform the law to the realities of adolescence
that these exceptions acknowledge, this Note first reviews the phil-
osophical and historical backdrop underlying our current "hodge-
podge"'" of policies concerning the rights and responsibilities of
adolescents. Second, this Note examines the current inconsistencies
in state policies concerning juvenile capacity in light of modern scien-
tific research. From this mix of theories emerges a new framework
for envisioning adolescence as a process, 3 requiring more nuanced
steps than the categorical adult/minor dichotomy.14 "Indeed, it is
arguable that citizenship is constituted by a cluster of rights and
duties that can be acquired progressively rather than all at once."' 5
This certainly is reflected in adolescents' prolonged economic depend-
ence on their parents, 6 which, coupled with the lengthened path of
educational achievement 7 and age of onset of major psychiatric ill-
ness, 8 indicates that the law should recognize adolescence as lasting
7. See Mary Pat Treuthart, Lowering the Bar: Rethinking Underage Drinking, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 307 (2006) (discussing the link between alcohol-related
age restrictions and a heightened paternalistic relationship between the state and youth).
8. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 295-96; NationalYouth Rights Association, Minors
Should Have the Right to Vote, in Do CHILDREN HAVE RIGHTS? 74, 75 (Jamuna Carroll
ed., 2006).
9. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 297.
10. Id. at 314-15.
11. Id. at 286-87, 293, 315-16.
12. Id. at 286, 311.
13. ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 89-96, 103-05.
14. Id. at 105-15.
15. DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 98 (2d ed. 2004).
16. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.
547, 564-66 (2000).
17. Id.
18. Onset of schizophrenia occurs in late adolescence for males and early adulthood for
females. Frances J. Lexcen & N. Dickon Reppucci, Psychology and the Law: Effects of
Psychopathology on Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
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at least until age twenty-one. However, to balance an extended period
of adolescence, this Note proposes a new framework expanding be-
havioral autonomy during adolescence.
This framework offers a bifurcated application ofparens patriae
in which six central milestones are divided into two stages of public
adulthood. The first stage includes the cognitive-based activities of
which teens between fifteen and sixteen years of age are capable and
which have minimal adverse social impact: voting and entering into
contracts.19 The second stage includes the socio-emotional judgment-
based activities that require more maturity, self-regulation and im-
pulse control in addition to cognitive ability, some of which pose a far
greater risk of adverse social impact: driving, use of guns, and con-
sumption of alcohol.2" Other activities in this group require greater
maturity and judgment, but are private decisions enacted through
the public sphere; these activities include medical decision making,
particularly decisions regarding abortion, marriage, and whether to
have children.2 Finally, this Note applies this framework to six areas
of law that capture discrete moments along the road to adulthood:
voting, entering a binding contract, driving, alcohol/firearm/tobacco
use, medical decision making, and marriage.22 This Note proposes
63, 84-85 (1998). Initial symptoms of bipolar disorder may manifest in adolescence,
although accurate diagnosis of bipolar disorder during adolescence is difficult because
of the overlap of symptoms with other psychiatric disorders. Id. at 86.
19. The impact of each adolescent's vote is diluted by the overall pool of voters where
an overwhelming majority exists. ARCHARD, supra note 15, at 98. Though there may be
some risk for both adolescents and others regarding contracts, it is more likely that
adolescents will gradually develop their commercial acumen. See Hartman, supra note
1, at 1302-03 (discussing the "disaffirmance rule" that allows minors to void contracts
under the guise that they are mentally incompetent to bargain in good faith); see
generally Cunningham, supra note 1, at 287-94 (exploring the history of the infancy
defense to legal contracts).
20. The risks arising from guns and driving are self-evident. The risk associated with
alcohol consumption is correlated with other events, most notably traffic accidents from
driving under the influence. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
21. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 317-19; Hartman, supra note 1, at 1266.
22. Juvenile culpability for criminal acts is the subject of significant debate and legal
scholarship in its own right. See, e.g., Beschle, supra note 1, at 65-66 (discussing the
prominence of retributive thought in the debate surrounding juvenile justice); Richard
E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals Based on
Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 709 (1997) (discussing multiple reform pro-
posals for juvenile justice); Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 273-75 (discussing the growing
dissatisfaction with the traditional juvenile justice system). However, this Note focuses
on developing a coherent legal framework for normative adolescent development, while
criminally involved juveniles require intervention for non-normative behavior. Neverthe-
less, the theoretical underpinnings of juvenile criminal culpability intertwine with these
areas of civil law in that criminal sanctions are the "stick," with civil rights and privileges
as "carrots," in the proverbial "carrot and stick" analogy describing behavioral motivation.
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realistic and consistent policies tailored to the scientifically docu-
mented needs of children while allowing flexibility in decision-making
capacity for juveniles whose lives require it. Most importantly, this
Note calls for adolescents fifteen or sixteen years of age to be granted
the right to vote as the first step in their path to public adulthood.
I. HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Western societies have historically treated a child's development
according to nodal ages (seven, fourteen, and twenty-one) that appear
consistently across cultures.23 "Full spiritual maturity is considered
by both the Jewish and Christian faiths to arrive at 13 or 14 years of
age." 4 A "landmark" age of fourteen, plus or minus a year, is roughly
the onset age of puberty and enhanced cognitive capacities.25 As steps
toward adulthood, these nodal ages corresponded with physical de-
velopment, such that "[p]hysical capability was more the ruling factor
than was time already spent on earth."26
In the Roman Empire, "a boy was presumed to be able to under-
stand the law at age 14" 27 and in Northern Europe from the ninth cen-
tury through the eleventh century, the age of majority was fifteen.2"
Then suddenly, for reasons that have been "lost to the historians,"
the English age of majority jumped from fifteen to twenty-one.29
The age of majority remained twenty-one for several centuries, thus
establishing the British common law rule (on which the U.S. legal
system was founded)3 that a child was an "infant" until the age of
twenty-one.31
"It appears that the timing of massive transitions in society's
thinking about ages and rights has less to do with real chronological
23. Give or take one year of age. COMM. ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, GROUP FOR THE
ADvANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REP. NO. 126, How OLD Is OLD ENOUGH?: THE AGES OF
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 7-9 (1989).
24. Id. at 9. The rite of Bar Mitzvah at age thirteen marks acceptance into the adult
congregation for Jewish youth. Id. at 10.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id.
29. Id. A preferred theory is that knights needed greater strength and agility because
of the shift in warfare from fighting on foot to the use of heavy armor and weapons on
horseback. Id. at 7-8.
30. See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 980 (rev. 2d ed. 2005)
(detailing the traditional observance of the British common law age of majority at
twenty-one in most American states until the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment);
see also Cunningham, supra note 1, at 290 (tracing the legal definition of infancy for
contract purposes back to the thirteenth century).
31. COMM. ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 23, at 7.
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ages than it does with the needs of society and the skills, matura-
tion, and volition the society perceives in and expects of its individual
children and adolescents." 2 The United States followed the English
common law until the late nineteenth century, using the "'rule of
sevens"'33 to assign criminal and civil liabilities 4 and establishing
twenty-one as the age at which individuals could exercise other rights
and privileges under civil law.35 Under this regime, children under
age seven are presumed incapable of criminal intent or negligence,
children age seven to fourteen enjoy a rebuttable presumption that
they are not capable of negligence or criminal culpability, and juve-
niles age fourteen and older are presumed capable of negligence and
criminal culpability." Often, adult standards are applied to minors
(including those fourteen and older) if they are involved in particu-
larly dangerous or "adult" activities.3"
In this regime, the age of fourteen continued to carry legal signif-
icance, as both British and U.S. apprenticeship laws3" and U.S. child
labor and compulsory schooling laws39 used the age of fourteen (or
thirteen) to regulate the labor market participation of juveniles.4"
Fourteen was also commonly the age at which courts would consider
a child's preference in U.S. custody cases.4
Despite the role that physical capacity played in constructing
social stages of maturity,42 examining these nodal ages - seven,
fourteen, and twenty-one - from a human development perspective
32. Id. at 8.
33. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability and
the Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 99 (2003).
34. KRAMER, supra note 30, at 742-45; Ehrlich, supra note 33, at 99.
35. The right to vote and legal age for purchase or consumption of alcohol was twenty-
one until the 1970s when the military draft of the Vietnam War highlighted the illogic
of sending eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds to war, yet deeming them incapable
under the law to vote or drink alcohol. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 297; Treuthart,
supra note 7, at 308.
36. KRAMER, supra note 30, at 742-43. For example, West Virginia courts follow the
rationale "that children between the ages of seven and [fourteen] are incapable of negli-
gence [because] such children usually lack the intelligence, maturity, and judgmental
capacity to be held accountable for their actions." Id. at 745. However, a child as young
as eight was considered an adult for criminal culpability in England until 1780. CoMM.
ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 23, at 10.
37. 'More often than not, the activity is one which requires the minor to have a license
(such as a license to drive automobiles)." KRAMER, supra note 30, at 747-48.
38. COMM. ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 23, at 12.
39. Id. "Like school law, child labor law directly reflects changing social modes,
financial conditions, and industrial practices. Here, chronological age is probably less
crucial a factor in setting standards than physical fitness and adeptness for work ..
Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 11-12.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id. at 6, 11.
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confirms that these demarcations also generally make sense when
one considers cognitive and emotional development.43 One of the
most influential theories of human development was outlined by
Jean Piaget, for whom "the state of adult maturity is defined in
logico-scientific terms as the capacity for formal operational, that is,
abstract and hypothetical, thinking."" In Piaget's framework chil-
dren develop through four cognitive stages and achieve "adult-like
reasoning abilities by age 15.""4 Research has refined and added
nuance to Piaget's theories,46 and cross-cultural studies have con-
firmed the general soundness and universality of his framework.4"
Moreover, a central component of Piaget's framework is that despite
the three major transitional periods between the four cognitive stages,
"[t]he beginning and end of a period is not sudden, but gradual, and
the periods merge one into the other.""4
Additionally, Piaget's framework includes "parallel factors of
emotional development that color cognitive performance""4 which
make psychoanalytic theory "an important framework for under-
standing how a child uses various cognitive skills in emotionally
tinged situations - the very same kinds of situations about which
the law and society are so concerned."" Considering cognitive and
emotional development in tandem is a more realistic approach to
examining adolescence as a process.5'
'The conscience as a mental structure is new to 7- and 8-year-
olds, and it tends to take a harsh ungiving hold upon the child's atti-
tudes and behaviors."52 Hence, children eight to nine years old tend
43. Id. at 15-16.
44. ARCHARD, supra note 15, at 42.
45. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 282. Infants and toddlers learn about the world
through their physical, "'sensorimotor,"' experiences. Id. Children ages two through
seven learn communication and social skills in the "'preoperational stage."' Id. From
ages seven through twelve, children experience heightened ordered learning ability in
the "'concrete operational stage.'" Id. Starting at around age twelve, in the "'formal
operational stage,"' children's cognitive capacity expands to include abstract reasoning;
abstract reasoning allows them to engage in advanced logical reasoning, including the
ability to weigh multiple options in predicting a likely outcome. Id. By age fifteen, most
children will have "amassed an adult-like cognitive ability." Id. at 282-83.
46. COMM. ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 23, at 20.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 21.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id. at 21.
51. "Childhood is defined as that which lacks the capacities, skills and powers of adult-
hood. To be a child is to be not yet an adult. Adulthood is something which is gained...."
ARCHARD, supra note 15, at 39. Further, "[c]hildren are understood as 'becoming', a stage,
rather than as 'being', a state. A child is an 'unfinished' adult .... "Id. at 41-42 (citation
omitted).
52. COMM. ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 23, at 26-27.
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to be very rule oriented and may express rigidities in thinking; 3
"the stronghold that the conscience establishes loosens considerably
by ages 10-12" and children begin exhibiting more flexible coping
strategies.54 Piaget's framework indicates that formal thought be-
gins shortly before age fourteen, and "[a]ll things considered, 14 [give
or take a year] is quite a good landmark age for the expectation by
society that children use abstract reasoning skills, and thus, that they
be given increased responsibility."55
Amidst their expanded cognitive capacities, adolescents "suf-
fer[] intense emotional assaults from burgeoning drives"' 56 associ-
ated with "sexual and aggressive urges" brought on by the physical
and hormonal changes of puberty.5" Emotional and experiential
factors influence actual understanding of a given situation,5" as "a
person's cognitive capacities may often be subject to distortion by
internal fantasy and external stress." " Taking a multitude of factors
into account,
the degree to which [adolescents] may display the expected
"formal" maturity of thought may be influenced by tumultuous
emotion, peer pressure, and family turmoil. Social coercion (the
peer group) often dictates teenagers' behavior .... Adolescence
is clearly the time of life when emotional withdrawal from the
family and movement toward the peer group may have a stronger
influence on behavior than does the capacity to reason. °
Herein lies the challenge of conforming laws and policies to afford
increased responsibility and autonomy to adolescents, given that "the
tumultuous mental life of the 13-14-year-old is very important when
the differences between 14 and 21 are considered. By 18, certainly by
21, we expect the emotional turmoil and bothersome intrusive fantasy
life of adolescence to be somewhat resolved."61
53. Id. at 26.
54. Id. at 27.
55. Id. at 29. In a review of developmental psychology research, only one study was
found that distinguished the reasoning of fourteen-year-olds from that of eighteen-year-
olds, though in some studies the eighteen-year-olds exhibited more "savvy" than pure
abstract reasoning. Id.
56. Id. at 32.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 32.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id. at 35.
61. Id. at 32.
INCREMENTAL INDEPENDENCE
II. MODERN VIEW OF CAPACITY: ROPER V. SIMMONS
"The significance of childhood for our time is more pronounced
than for previous societies. It is seen as meriting a clear separation
of adult and child worlds."62 Our modern view is that
childhood is a stage or state of incompetence relative to adult-
hood. The ideal adult is equipped with certain cognitive capaci-
ties, rational, physically independent, autonomous, has a sense
of identity and is conscious of its beliefs and desires, and thus able
to make informed free choices for which it can be held personally
responsible. It is on account of these dispositions that an adult is
thought able to work for its living, be accountable at law for its
actions, make sexual choices and help to choose the government
of its community. It is because the child lacks these adult dispo-
sitions that it may not participate in this adult world.'
One can consider adulthood either as a state or as a process; if con-
sidered a process, "there can be no obvious line of division between
[adulthood] and childhood."'
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the question of
whether juveniles who committed a capital offense while under the
age of eighteen could be treated categorically when considering the
constitutionality of the death penalty.65 In Roper v. Simmons, the
Court expressly abrogated Stanford v. Kentucky, a case decided fif-
teen years earlier in which the Court had considered the same ques-
tion and reached the opposite result.6 The Roper Court's analysis
relies on many sources from which we draw our modern conception
of "capacity."6
In Roper, the Court juxtaposed the jurisprudence regarding the
death penalty for juveniles with that concerning the death penalty
for the mentally retarded and asked whether juveniles, as a group,
possess sufficient capacity to be held criminally culpable and subject
62. ARCHARD, supra note 15, at 31.
63. Id. at 30.
64. Id. at 36-37 (citation omitted).
65. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (holding that execution of juveniles
who were under eighteen at the time of the offense is unconstitutional under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
66. Id. at 552, 575; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
67. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561,569-70 (drawing on state-determined "evolving standards
of decency," experiences of parents, "scientific and sociological studies," and developmental
psychology research and theory, including the work of noted developmental psychology
theorist Erik Erikson); see also Foxworth, supra note 1, at 501-02 (noting that the
Thompson Court relied on developmental psychology studies in finding that younger
adolescents did not have the capacity to develop criminal intent).
2009]
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to the maximum penalty of execution."5 In Thompson v. Oklahoma,
the plurality of the Court determined that standards of decency pro-
hibited execution of individuals who were under sixteen at the time
of the crime.69 The Thompson Court also observed that
[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency
to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of
his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been ex-
pressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations
that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading mem-
bers of the Western European community. 0
The Thompson Court explained that "'[t]he reasons why juveniles
are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult
also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally repre-
hensible as that of an adult."' 7' The following year, however, the
Court held in Stanford that execution of offenders under eighteen
years of age at the time of the offense was not categorically uncon-
stitutional. 2 On the same day, the Court ruled in Penry v. Lynaugh
that execution of the mentally retarded was also constitutional.7 In
Penry and Stanford, "the Court also 'emphatically reject[ed]' the
suggestion that the Court should bring its own judgment to bear on
the acceptability of the juvenile death penalty." 74 The Court consid-
ered only whether the number of states that had adopted such poli-
cies were numerous enough to constitute a consensus indicative of a
national normative standard. 5
In 2002, the Court revisited the question as to the constitution-
ality of the death penalty for the mentally retarded.76 In Atkins v.
Virginia, the Court "returned to the rule, established in decisions pre-
dating Stanford, that 'the Constitution contemplates that in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."'"
The Court found that mental retardation diminished culpability,
making the death penalty less defensible as a retributive measure
and less effective as a deterrent. 8
68. Roper, 543 U.S. at 552, 569.
69. Id. at 561 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 562 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989)).
73. Id. (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305 (1989)).
74. Id. (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78).
75. Id. at 562-63.
76. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
77. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).
78. Id. (citations omitted).
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In Roper, the Court considered the extent to which a national
consensus could be found by looking at the number of state legisla-
tures that had barred such executions or whose governors had altered
state policy by commuting death sentences to life in prison.79 Though
the number of states moving to prohibit such executions was found
to be fewer than those analyzed in Atkins, the Roper Court found a
similar and significant trend indicating a growing national consensus
against such executions.'o Using the language of the Atkins Court
concerning the mentally retarded, the Court in Roper found "that
today our society views juveniles ... as 'categorically less culpable
than the average criminal."' 8 '
III. POST-ROPER INCONSISTENCIES REMAIN
The Court's landmark ruling in Roper eliminated only the most
obvious and troubling tension reflected by the hodgepodge of laws and
policies governing adolescents.82 Before Roper, the strongest argu-
ment for increased rights and autonomy for adolescents was the in-
herent dissonance between adolescents' possible criminal liability -
including capital punishment - and the range of behavior from
which they were precluded because of presumptive lack of decisional
capacity.'M Though less glaring, this dissonance continues after Roper
in the trend of holding delinquent juveniles responsible as adults for
their misdeeds,' including life sentences for crimes committed as
minors.8 5
79. Id. at 564-67.
80. Id. at 565-66.
81. Id. at 567 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). A key factor, perhaps under-
acknowledged by the Court itself, that likely influenced the Court's analysis in Roper
was the parallel between the organic brain limitations of the mentally retarded and the
brain immaturity of adolescents; the amicus curiae brief submitted by the American
Medical Association (AMA) discussed this parallel. See Keely A. Magyar, Betwixt and
Between But Being Booted Nonetheless: A Developmental Perspective on Aging Out of
Foster Care, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 557, 579-85 (2006). Magyar relies on the AMA's amicus
brief in Roper to explain how recent medical research indicates that processes of "synaptic
pruning" and "myelineation" in the prefrontal cortex and cerebellum continue at least
until age twenty-one, and likely longer, thus delaying adolescents' ability to control
impulses and weigh the consequences of their actions in an adult manner. Id.
82. See Nicole A. Saharsky, Note, Consistency as a Constitutional Value: A Comparative
Look at Age in Abortion and Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1119, 1120,
1134, 1146-49 (2001) (calling for the end of capital punishment for juveniles because both
the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments demand consistent treatment of juvenile
offenders and juvenile women seeking abortions).
83. Id. at 1119, 1135.
84. See Beschle, supra note 1, at 65 (noting that the rehabilitative model of juvenile
justice is diminishing, with more states now holding juveniles accountable as adults for
their crimes); Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 288-91 (noting that under these policies
"children are considered most competent when they are most delinquent" as the level of
adult responsibility imposed correlates with the degree of violence of the delinquent act).
85. EQUALJUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUELAND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD
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This dissonance in the decisional capacity attributed to adoles-
cents in the juvenile justice system and other legal areas arose in
large part because the two systems evolved separately 6 and with
differing underlying public policies.8 " Juvenile courts emerged in the
early twentieth century with the goal of rehabilitation for juvenile
criminal offenders.8" However, through a series of cases starting in
the late 1960s, the Supreme Court replaced the paternalism and lack
of adversarial process of the juvenile justice system with due process
rights for juveniles equal to those of adults.89 This began the reversion
of juvenile courts back to the adult penal model.9 "
The juvenile justice system has the simultaneous purposes of
punishment,91 protecting society, 2 and rehabilitating the juvenile in
preparation for a law-abiding adulthood.93 In contrast, the status of
minors as legally incompetent in other legal matters serves the pur-
poses of protecting children from their own bad judgment94 as well
as from outside exploitation95 and preserving parental authority.96
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 4 (2007), available at http://www.eji.org/eji/files/20071017
cruelandunusual.pdf. Following Roper, efforts have begun to eliminate life sentences
without possibility of parole for crimes committed in early adolescence. Id. at 3.
86. See Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 282-85 (discussing the Supreme Court's tendency
to keep issues regarding rights of minors in criminal matters separate from matters
outside the criminal context and discussing the Court's recognition of juveniles' right to
basic due process protections).
87. Juvenile justice was separated from other juvenile issues in order to provide
rehabilitation and guidance for delinquent youth whose parents would not or could not
do so. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 313. The presumption of juvenile incapacity in civil
matters was to protect children from being "tak[en] advantage of... due to their in-
experience in the marketplace." Id. at 291.
88. Beschle, supra note 1, at 69-71; Scott, supra note 16, at 578, 580; Foxworth, supra
note 1, at 498, 505.
89. In re Gault is generally considered the turning point after which juveniles were
afforded the same essential due process protections as adults in the criminal justice
system. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967); see Beschle, supra note 1, at 71-73 (noting that
Gault was a victory for advocates of children's rights); Scott, supra note 16, at 578-81
(noting that juvenile delinquents are often "indistinguishable from adult criminals");
Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 283-84 (noting that the Supreme Court enhanced proce-
dural protections for juveniles in Gault, a case which the Court relied on to further extend
procedural protections for juveniles); Foxworth, supra note 1, at 499-500, 505-06 (explain-
ing the procedural safeguards Gault provided for juveniles).
90. Beschle, supra note 1, at 70-73; Hartman, supra note 1, at 1281; Scott, supra note
16, at 579,587-88; Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 284-85; Foxworth, supra note 1, at 498-500.
91. Scott, supra note 16, at 549.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 578-80 (noting that the goal of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation
rather than punishment); Foxworth, supra note 1, at 498 (describing the rehabilitative
focus of the juvenile justice system a century ago).
94. See Scott, supra note 16, at 550-51, 553 (describing parents' responsibilities as
protectors of their children).
95. Id. at 551, 553.
96. Id. at 550-52 (noting that "[tiraditionally, policy debates.., have focused on the
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Moreover, states have tended to defer to the interests of parents in
noncriminal juvenile matters9 7 both because of parents' constitution-
ally protected rights in determining how to rear their children98 and
for the potential responsibility that may pass to parents from the acts
of their children.99
Scholars surveying the inconsistencies in the legal treatment of
adolescents call for using a developmental model' ° to balance the
interests of parents, society, and adolescents. 10' This model would ac-
knowledge the mature cognitive capacity of older teens"' and nur-
ture their decisional sophistication.' 3 The arguments in favor of using
a developmental model rely on Piaget's multi-stage model of cognitive
development0 4 and historical patterns.' 5 Of note is the significant
research examining adolescent decision making that confirms Piaget's
model'0 6 and these historical customs.
10 7
Specifically, the accumulation of research examining adolescent
decisional capacity "suggest[s] that adolescents, aged 14 and older,
possess the cognitive capability to reason, understand, appreciate,
and articulate decisions comparable to young adults."'08 In a study
of the reasoning of nine- to fourteen-year-olds as subjects of child
allocation of authority between parents and the state," but not the liberty and autonomy
of the child).
97. Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 285.
98. Scott, supra note 16, at 551 (noting that "parental 'rights' [can be viewed] as legal
compensation for the burden of responsibility that the law imposes on parents").
99. Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 298-99.
100. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 369 (calling for a Model Children's Code de-
veloped jointly by the fields of law and psychology); see also Hartman, supra note 1, at
1355-56 (calling for a model recognizing the decisional ability of adolescents rather than
focusing on decisional incapacity); Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 298-300 (noting the lack
of effectiveness in the current juvenile justice system). But see Scott, supra note 16, at
560-61 (acknowledging that the "bright line rule" of the age of majority "ignores individual
variations in developmental maturity as well as varying maturity demands across the
range of legal rights and responsibilities," but concluding that the alternative of "custom-
ized age grading' on a case-by-case basis would be too costly and impracticable).
101. Scott, supra note 16, at 558.
102. Hartman, supra note 1, at 1355 (calling for "[a]n adolescent autonomy model
recogniz[ing] decisional ability, as opposed to decisional incapacity"); Cuncannan, supra
note 1, at 295-99 (calling for an individualized approach implemented through a rebut-
table presumption of competence for delinquent and nondelinquent minors age fourteen
and older).
103. See Hartman, supra note 1, at 1268-69 (noting the benefits of a shift in focus to
the decisional ability of adolescents).
104. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 282-84; Hartman, supra note 1, at 1285-86;
Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 292-93.
105. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 290; Hartman, supra note 1, at 1271-72;
Cuncannan, supra note 1, at 293-94.
106. Hartman, supra note 1, at 1285-86.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1286.
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custody dilemmas, fourteen-year-olds performed as well as eighteen-
year-olds when asked about "real-life" hypothetical problems."° Stud-
ies also confirm Piaget's model concerning the age at which minors can
participate effectively in their medical decisions."'0 When compared
with young adults of eighteen and twenty-one years of age, fourteen-
year-olds expressed similar reasoning as to medical decisions, where-
as nine-year-olds in the same study did not.' Similarly, in a study
of teenagers faced with unplanned pregnancies, teens "'14 to 17
appear to be similar to legal adults in both cognitive competence and
volition"' and were "competent decision makers" despite the highly
emotional context.
1 2
In the criminal context, research has shown that with regard to
understanding their Miranda rights and the significance of waiving
such rights, teens younger than fifteen "manifested significantly
poorer comprehension than adults of comparable intelligence," while
teens fifteen and older "understood their constitutional rights, along
with the consequent waiver of those rights, in a manner comparable
to adults.""'
Modern technology, however, has advanced research concerning
the physical capacity of adolescents to translate this adult-like cogni-
tive capacity into mature behavior. 1 4 Significantly, the areas of the
brain that regulate "mature reasoning and self-control," the temporal
lobes and prefrontal cortex, "do not fully develop until late adoles-
cence." 1' In fact, emerging research indicates that brain maturation
related to impulse control and judgment continues into young adult-
hood." '6 This may account for the findings of other researchers that,
despite their comparable cognitive capacity, "adolescents' outcomes
differ from adults because of peer influence and different perceptions
of risk and time.""' 7 This realization that adolescents are less able
109. Id. at 1290 (noting that the nine- and ten-year-olds responded as reasonably and
rationally as the fourteen- to eighteen-year.olds).
110. Id. at 1320.
111. Id. (confirming prior research indicating "'little evidence that minors age 15 and
above as a group are any less competent to provide [medical] consent than are adults"'
(citation omitted)).
112. Id. at 1351-52 (citation omitted).
113. Id. at 1300 (citation omitted).
114. Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13
PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 115, 116-17 (2007); Magyar, supra note 81, at 579-85; see also
Cunningham, supra note 1, at 281 (describing the impact of modern technology on
researching the cognitive capacity of adolescents).
115. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 281; see also Magyar, supra note 81, at 579-85.
116. See Aronson, supra note 114, at 121 (noting that "many important regions of the
brain continue to develop through adolescence and into adulthood"); Magyar, supra note
81, at 579-85.
117. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 284.
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than adults to use their mature cognitive capacity because of their
greater "susceptibil[ity] to psychosocial factors such as peer influence
and lack of impulse control""1 8 led scholars to call for the construction
of adolescence as an intermediate category in the law, thus capturing
"the modern view that this group has greater cognitive abilities than
children, but less self-control than adults."'1 9
IV. THE NEED TO EXTEND LEGAL ADOLESCENCE TO AT LEAST
TWENTY-ONE
In addition to the legal inconsistencies facing adolescents today,
several factors suggest the need to return to the common law age of
twenty-one as the age of majority.20 First, the age of "adulthood" has
historically fluctuated based upon societal needs and what is required
of children and adults. 1' Today, educational paths to adult occupa-
tions or professions extend for longer periods of time.'22 Additionally,
the transition from adolescent to young adult is extending as adoles-
cents remain economically dependent on their parents into their early
twenties. 23 State laws requiring health insurance companies to allow
college students to remain on their parents' policies reflect this length-
ened financial dependence. 24 Tax codes and financial aid policies
also consider college students as dependents.'2 5
118. Id. at 316-17.
119. Id. at 317.
120. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 290; see also Magyar, supra note 81, at 601-05
(advocating extension of federally funded foster care until age twenty-one and noting the
range of activities for which states have re-adopted twenty-one as the age of majority).
121. See COMM. ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 23, at 8 (noting that society's per-
ception of age and associated rights fluctuates according to society's needs and volition
rather than with actual chronological age).
122. Magyar, supra note 81, at 587-91 (discussing social science research documenting
the economic, educational, and societal changes that have altered trajectories into adult-
hood and contributed to "the now widely accepted notion that adolescents are neither
children nor adults").
123. Id. at 591-95; see Scott, supra note 16, at 564-66 (noting the extended length of
parents' financial obligations to their children in recent decades).
124. Kelly L. Wright, Comment, College Students Beware: Problems and Pitfalls in
Student Health Insurance, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 531, 534 (1999).
125. Karin McAnaney, Note, Finding the Proper Balance: Protecting Suicidal Students
Without Harming Universities, 94 VA. L. REV. 197, 204 (2008). For example, the state of
Virginia considers students dependents until age twenty-four and bases in-state status
for admission and tuition at Virginia's public universities on parents' residency. Susan
Kinzie, The University of Uncertainty: Va. Children of Illegal Immigrants Lack In-State
Status, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2008, at BO. The Virginia Attorney General recently had
to clarify this policy when the University of Virginia initially denied in-state status to
a U.S. citizen born to illegal immigrants because his parents could not establish legal
Virginia residency. Susan Kinzie, UPDATE: U-Va. Accepts Residency Claim, WASH.
POST, Mar. 24, 2008, at B05.
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Second, late adolescence is the age of onset for major mental
illnesses, including bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.'26 Although
older adolescents are generally deemed to have decisional capacity
to make certain medical decisions,'27 these mental illnesses by defini-
tion affect decisional capacity.'28 Particularly at onset, an individual's
decisional capacity may be impeded to the extent that he or she will
not receive treatment without involuntary intervention.'29 However,
if medical professionals effectively treat early onset symptoms, they
can educate patients about their condition and minimize the disrup-
tion to their patients' development. 3 ° Extending the legal category of
adolescence would facilitate parents learning of their child's mental
illness and participating in early and effective intervention.'
Finally, the illogic of the inconsistencies related to adolescent de-
cisional capacity is not lost on the adolescents themselves, 132 and it
undermines their developing "sense of responsibility" and "account-
ability ... [as] emerging adult[s].' 33 Political forces drove the re-
duction of the age of "adulthood" to eighteen in order to match the
age at which young men were being drafted and sent to war.13 4 Polit-
ical forces again intervened to reinstate the legal age for purchase
and consumption of alcohol to twenty-one in an attempt to reduce
traffic fatalities caused by teens driving under the influence. 135 The
change in policy has, in fact, reduced traffic accidents and fatalities
involving teens; however, correlation has been substituted for causal-
ity without examination into adolescents' decisional capacity regarding
126. Lexcen & Reppucci, supra note 18, at 84, 86.
127. See Hartman, supra note 1, at 1309-11 (identifying several exceptions to the
presumption of decisional incapacity for minors, specifically voluntary consent for
treatment of substance abuse, mental health, sexually transmitted diseases, and
contraception).
128. See Rachel A. Scherer, Note, Toward A Twenty-First Century Civil Commitment
Statute: A Legal, Medical, and Policy Analysis of Preventive Outpatient Treatment, 4 IND.
HEALTH L. REv. 361,375-76 (2007) (explaining that individuals with mental illness often
do not realize they suffer from any disorder).
129. Id.
130. See Lexcen & Reppucci, supra note 18, at 106 (discussing the interaction between
psychopathology, development, and decisional capacity).
131. See McAnaney, supra note 125, at 203-04 (discussing the legal restrictions and
confusion that universities face in trying to help a student with emerging mental illness,
including that "[o]nce a student reaches the age of eighteen, the rights accorded to the
student's parents, including permission requirements for access to records, are
transferred to the student only").
132. See, e.g., Treuthart, supra note 7, at 304-06 (discussing the high rate of underage
alcohol consumption despite the uniform law prohibiting the consumption of alcohol by
individuals under twenty-one, leading to "disrespect for the legal system").
133. Hartman, supra note 1, at 1304.
134. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 277; Treuthart, supra note 7, at 308.
135. Treuthart, supra note 7, at 308-12.
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alcohol." While acknowledging the seriousness of the priorities under-
lying such policies, this Note seeks to provide a more consistent and
reasoned framework for adolescent milestones.
V. THE NEW BIFURCATED FRAMEWORK
This Note proposes a bifurcated framework whereby adolescents
are allowed incremental decisional autonomy according to the capac-
ity required for mature execution of decisional autonomy, balanced
against the potential personal or public risk associated with a par-
ticular behavior. By redefining "capacity"'37 as a mix of cognitive
ability and socio-emotional judgment," this new framework provides
a logical and more consistent ordering of gradually increasing adoles-
cent autonomy. Among the areas of law that require mature cog-
nitive capacity, but carry low personal or social risk, are voting and
entering into contracts. 139 On the other hand, activities that require
mature socio-emotional judgment, in conjunction with mature cog-
nitive capacity, can be further divided into activities conducted in the
public sphere that pose personal risk solely to the adolescent,14° versus
those public activities that pose significant risk to others as well.'
A. Voting
The most concrete proposal of this new framework advocates
granting the right to vote to fifteen- or sixteen- year-olds. Using a con-
servative reading of the research,142 the general framework presumes
that by age fifteen, adolescents have the requisite cognitive maturity
to understand each of these activities and articulate reasonable deci-
sions. 143 This research, however, also indicates that each activity must
be evaluated to examine the potential for socio-emotional factors to
interfere with appropriate application of mature cognitive capacity.'"
136. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 297-98.
137. Traditionally, "capacity" has been defined as "competency," a common definition
of which refers to an individual's "'capacity to understand the material information, to
make a judgment about the information in light of their values, to intend a certain
outcome, and to communicate freely their wishes to care givers or investigators."'
Cunningham, supra note 1, at 279 (citations omitted).
138. See Hartman, supra note 1, at 1303-05.
139. See supra note 19 (explaining that the vote of each adolescent is diluted by the
total pool of voters and that only "some risk" exists for adolescents entering into contracts).
140. Such activities include marriage, medical decision making, abortion, and use of
tobacco.
141. Such activities include driving, drinking alcohol, and use of firearms.
142. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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Also included in the balance of socio-emotional judgment are activities
that carry a risk of severe negative outcomes that could result from
immature behavior by the adolescent. 4 ' Arguably, voting carries the
least potential for socio-emotional interference146 and the potential
damage of an adolescent's bad voting judgment is quite minimal.'47
Aside from this logic for granting fifteen- or sixteen-year-olds the
right to vote, the pro-social civic engagement of voting is an appropri-
ate first step in adolescents' adult participation in society. "Children
should not only be educated for their eventual citizenship, but actively
be educated in citizenship at every available opportunity."'48 Indeed,
"[iln a democracy, suffrage is the mark of citizenship."'49
As with other privileges withheld from adolescents, the law denies
adolescents the right to vote on the grounds that they lack the re-
quired criteria5 ° "allegedly possessed by adults but not children."' 5 '
Competence for voters "is normally defined as a capacity to make
rational decisions about alternative parties or policies in the light of
available information about them."'52 Specifically, "[t]he competence
required of a voter is a minimal rationality, an ability to distinguish
between parties, candidates and policies in terms of interests, aims
and goals which can be identified as worth promoting.... It cannot
be required (though it can be desired) of voters that they make wise
choices." " Yet, scientific research into adolescent decision making
clearly indicates that many teens by age fourteen, 5 4 and certainly
most teens by fifteen or sixteen,'55 possess mature cognitive capacity
on par with young adults.
156
Importantly, "research shows many young people to be inter-
ested in politics and to be keen to express their views on those matters
145. See supra note 141.
146. The privacy of the voting booth and the anonymity of each person's vote will likely
minimize any of the effects of peer pressure.
147. Although
many political scientists and theorists have pointed to the limited utility of
the vote in many democratic contexts... [for example], the extra vote of any
one person in an overwhelming majority carries little, if any, extra weight.
Nevertheless, the possession of a right to vote is central to citizenship,
and it is a symbolic affirmation of one's political status even when it seems
to have little instrumental value for an individual.
ARCHARD, supra note 15, at 98.
148. Id. at 104.
149. Id. at 98.
150. Scott, supra note 16, at 562.
151. ARCHARD, supra note 15, at 99.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 101.
154. See supra notes 55, 108-12 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 55, 108-12 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 55, 108-12 and accompanying text.
INCREMENTAL INDEPENDENCE
affecting them."'57 Findings of a study examining schoolchildren's
capacity for understanding political issues show that children as
young as eleven understand the vocabulary and ideas required for
electoral participation as well as most adults. 58 '"This finding does
not conclusively show that 11 -year-olds have the basic competence
of adult voters. But it does suggest that, to adopt a ready and conve-
nient age, teenagers could be thought capable of voting."5 9 Notably,
the voting age is sixteen in Brazil, Croatia, and Cuba and is fifteen
in Iran. 60
Moreover, once the myth of adolescent incapacity is dispelled,
it is "inconsistent for a jurisdiction to hold a given age group respon-
sible at law for their actions, but not mature enough to play any part
in the process whereby that law is shaped and validated." 6' If parents
and society seek responsible citizenship from our children, they can-
not ignore this inconsistency and must afford adolescents full civic
participation in line with their capacity.
B. Flexibility
For the remaining activities that carry some risk to teens and/or
others, this framework proposes the expansion of existing mechanisms
providing individualized evaluations of adolescents' capacities. A
key factor in considering such a new framework is distinguishing
between inherently social activities6 2 and activities that are private
in nature, in which state intervention only arises if the decisions of
adolescents conflict with parental authority.'63 Thus, for inherently
social activities, this framework proposes creating a licensing process
similar to that used for granting driving privileges. The licensing
process for driving requires teens to complete certain educational and
training components before earning a license to drive.' Further-
more, the recent trend of conditionally licensing teen drivers with
gradually decreasing restrictions16 5 and tightened state oversight
157. ARCHARD, supra note 15, at 101.
158. Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 100.
162. These activities include those the state prohibits, despite possible parental approval
and oversight, such as driving before age sixteen and purchasing alcohol.
163. These activities include abortion, marriage, and medical decision making.
164. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 334-36 (drawing a parallel between driving and
marriage as licensed activities in which the state may allow teens younger than eighteen,
with parental permission, to engage).
165. Scott, supra note 16, at 577.
2009]
682 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:663
and restrictions for misconduct'" illustrates an incremental approach
that rewards responsible teens while retaining state authority to re-
strict irresponsible adolescents and limiting social risks.
167
For private decisions that require mature socio-emotional judg-
ment, most states employ mechanisms whereby "before a minor is
deemed to be capable of either exercising a right or privilege, or to be
held responsible for an action, an adult, such as a judge or parent,
must determine that the particular minor is sufficiently capable." 168
This "'mature minor"' doctrine may reflect the approach that many
parents take in respecting their teens' wishes, after ensuring that
they fully understand their options and the consequences of their
choices. 169 Thus, public policy exceptions serve as safeguards for ado-
lescents who do not have such functional relationships with a parent
or guardian or whose interests conflict with those of their parents.170
In accordance with psychological research, the mature minor doc-
trine "essentially carves out a new category of adolescents who, on a
case-by-case basis, may have the capacity to give consent for medi-
cal treatment."17' Other exceptions that create categories of capable
juveniles are minors who have married,'72 emancipated minors, 173
and juveniles who elect to use a judicial bypass mechanism to obtain
an abortion.7 4
This new framework proposes expanding the licensing of capable
juveniles, thus allowing them to execute contracts and purchase and
use alcohol, tobacco, and firearms. Similar to the process for obtaining
a driver's license, such conditional licensing would require an educa-
tional and training component, competence testing, and restriction by
the state for misconduct. 175 As with driver's licenses, any licensing
166. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 335 (noting that "[e]ven after a child passes his
or her written and 'road' tests and the state determines that he or she should receive
a... license, it may still be conditional on the permission of the parents").
167. Scott, supra note 16, at 597-98.
168. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 323-24.
169. See Scott, supra note 16, at 567.
170. Id. at 568, 570-71.
171. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 324-25 (noting the existence of narrow exceptions
for public health reasons when minors are "categorically capable of giving consent"); see
also Scott, supra note 16, at 567-68 (providing a detailed definition of the mature minor
doctrine).
172. Chadwick N. Gardner, Casenote, Don't Come Cryin' to Daddy! Emancipation of
Minors: When is a Parent 'Free at Last' from the Obligation of Child Support?, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 927, 931 (1994).
173. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 332-34.
174. Id. at 325-27, 330; Scott, supra note 16, at 573-76 (describing the judicial bypass
hearing as "a unique regulatory scheme" through which the U.S. Supreme Court created
an "intermediate category" to address the highly morally charged issue of teenage
abortion).
175. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 334-36.
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by the state for these activities would still be conditioned on parental
approval.'76
In circumstances in which a parent and child conflict, a judicial
bypass procedure would be available for the determination of the in-
dividual juvenile's capacity. Unlike the traditional judicial bypass
procedure, however, which is designed to be used by juveniles afraid
of involving their parents in their abortion decision,' this framework
would allow for parental involvement in the judicial determination
of individual capacity for social activities that expose both the teen and
society to risks. 7 ' Under this framework, a teen whose parents do not
consent to the conditional licensing may appeal to a state office and
prove his or her capacity in order to override the parents' decision.'79
CONCLUSION
By creating a formal intermediate category in the law for ado-
lescence and extending legal adolescence to twenty-one, this frame-
work would resolve many of the inconsistencies that currently exist
in U.S. laws."8 ° The current system sets the age of majority at age
eighteen, with exceptions carved out both above and below eighteen
to serve varying policy priorities.' Inherent in parens patriae, the
state is tasked with nurturing and promoting development of self-
determination, yet "[p] resumptive decisional incapacity damages the
life-long development of decision-making ability" of adolescents.8 2
After reviewing the historical and philosophical underpinnings
of the common law age of majority of twenty-one, this Note surveyed
scientific research and developmental psychology theory. Finding that
modern science has confirmed historical and cross-cultural patterns,
this Note analyzed several adolescent milestones according to the
capacity required of adolescents, rather than the specific policy pri-
ority to be served. This analysis divided major adolescent develop-
mental milestones into two categories of required capacity, cognitive
176. Id. at 334-35 (noting that driving and marriage are two areas that seem categorical
but are individualized in practice because of the exceptions granted with parental consent).
177. See Scott, supra note 16, at 568, 570-71.
178. This would essentially expand the parental involvement laws concerning teens
seeking abortions. See Foxworth, supra note 1, at 495-96 (describing the state of parental
involvement in abortion rights law regarding minor teenagers).
179. If such an override were granted, parents would not be obligated to provide eco-
nomic or other support to the teen in pursuing that activity, including assuming or
sharing any legal liability.
180. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing the inconsistencies
in U.S. laws regarding adolescents).
181. Id.
182. Hartman, supra note 1, at 1269.
20091 683
684 WILIJAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:663
and socio-emotional judgment. Significantly, from this analysis, this
Note calls for adolescents as young as fifteen or sixteen years of age
to be granted the right to vote.
For developmental milestones that require socio-emotional judg-
ment - in addition to mature cognitive capacity - the proposed
bifurcated framework draws on the example of conditional driver's
licenses for adolescents. Under such a regime, "youth welfare and
social welfare are both served by the creation of an intermediate cate-
gory" during which teens have the opportunity to prove their capa-
bility and responsibility.'83 This innovation "allow [s] young persons
to gain experience while limiting risk.""s
This kind of innovative approach is needed because "[a]dolescence
itself has become increasingly complex" in today's world, and teens
"are more sophisticated and have more freedom than ever before...
[while] dependency extends further into adulthood."'85 Just as a
minor's transition from financial and emotional dependence on his or
her parent is gradual, such an approach would also build into public
policy the "fad[ing]" nature of parens patriae "as the minor gets older
and [which] disappears upon her reaching adulthood."'86
Finally, the review of historical patterns revealed that the tran-
sition from childhood to adulthood is socially constructed based on
the needs of society and what society will physically and mentally re-
quire of young adults." 7 Notably, "[s]ocial customs have undergone
significant change within the past 30 years, and teenagers are much
more independent in all areas of their lives."" It is time to conform
adolescence under the law to the complex realities of teenage lives
lived today.
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